President Donald Trump’s recent threats to impose a 25% tariff on any iPhone sold in the United States but not assembled domestically have reignited debate over whether Apple can realistically shift production back to American soil. Seen as a keystone of the administration’s “reshoring” agenda, the proposal has drawn swift pushback from analysts, supply chain experts and Apple itself. Behind the headlines about “little screws” and “robotic arms” lie far deeper economic, technological and legal hurdles that cast doubt on the feasibility of U.S.-made iPhones anytime soon.

Supply Chain Complexity Defies Easy Relocation

At the heart of the challenge is the staggering complexity of the iPhone supply chain. Modern smartphones contain hundreds of individual components—processors, memory chips, sensors, cameras, displays, printed circuit boards, and more—sourced from dozens of suppliers around the world. Final assembly in China, India and Vietnam sits atop a vast network of specialized subcontractors that provide precision glass, tiny metal parts, micro-coils and other components. Apple’s longtime partner factories, primarily run by Foxconn and Pegatron, operate within manufacturing clusters where vendors for plastics, metals and electronics sit within hours of the main assembly lines. Recreating that ecosystem in the United States would require building not only new assembly plants but also hiring or incentivizing entire networks of component makers to set up U.S.-based operations—an undertaking likely to take years and cost tens of billions of dollars.

Experts point out that while Apple could theoretically build a sparkly new factory in, say, Texas or Ohio, it would still face the problem of where to source miniature passive components—resistors, capacitors and inductors that measure just fractions of a millimeter. In China’s Guangdong province or India’s Tamil Nadu state, thousands of small shops produce exactly those bare components, feeding them directly into the larger factories. In contrast, the U.S. electronics industry today relies heavily on imports of key components; only a handful of firms produce advanced semiconductors here, and most passive parts are still manufactured overseas. In short, the “ecosystem effect”—the ability to tap local vendors, component fabricators, and logistics partners in one cluster—is something the United States has lost over the past two decades of globalization.

Tiny Screws and the Limits of Automation

Recent remarks by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, who suggested that “millions and millions of human beings screwing in little, little screws” could be automated in U.S. plants, underscored another profound obstacle: the current limits of automation technology. Indeed, iPhones rely on dozens of microscopic fasteners to anchor internal modules in place. In traditional assembly lines, trained workers deftly insert these screws at rates of hundreds per hour, using specialized hand tools. To replicate that level of precision at U.S. scale, robotic arms would need to coordinate multiple degrees of freedom, sub-millimeter accuracy and high throughput. While Apple and its manufacturing partners have begun experimenting with automation in Chinese plants—deploying camera-guided robots to handle certain repetitive tasks—the technology to fully automate tiny-screw insertion is not yet available at the necessary scale.

Considerable robotic development would be required to construct an end-to-end system capable of handling delicate flex cables, aligning camera modules, and screwing down fragile metal casings at the speed and cost points Apple demands. Robotics firms estimate that designing, testing, and certifying such machines for mass production could take anywhere from three to five years—assuming Apple is willing to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in R\&D. Even after such automation is perfected, the cost per unit would likely remain far higher than human assembly in Asia, given steep purchase prices for advanced industrial robots and the overhead of maintaining complex machine vision systems.

Skilled Labor Shortages and Workforce Readiness

Beyond the machines themselves, a second labor-related hurdle looms large: a shortage of skilled workers. While many assembly jobs in Asia are performed by entry-level employees with minimal formal training, the shift to automation would require a cadre of robotics technicians, mechanical engineers and maintenance specialists—talent that is already in short supply within the United States. Factory floor staff would need not only to oversee automated lines, but also perform precision calibrations, rapid troubleshooting, and software maintenance. Although federal and state governments have recently pledged funding for STEM retraining programs and vocational certification, the pipeline for qualified robotics technicians remains nascent.

Even if Apple invested heavily in developing training academies—perhaps partnering with community colleges or technical institutes—it could take years before a sufficient number of graduates entered the workforce. Meanwhile, many U.S. manufacturing facilities struggle to find candidates for existing roles in automotive, aerospace or industrial equipment production, where pay scales are already competitive. Convincing Americans to take on “iPhone screwing” jobs—positioned as high-tech but still repetitive assembly tasks—may prove difficult unless wages rise significantly above prevailing manufacturing salaries. The scarcity of localized talent thus compounds the problem: even a highly automated line cannot run without experienced workers to program, monitor and repair it.

Escalating Production Costs and Consumer Impact

Perhaps the most visible consequence of reshoring production would be higher costs. In China, labor expenses average roughly $2–$3 per hour in coastal manufacturing hubs, whereas comparable roles in the United States can exceed $20–$25 per hour once benefits and overhead are factored in. Add in the cost of land, utilities, taxes and regulatory compliance—elements that are generally far higher in U.S. industrial zones—and the economics shift dramatically. Wedbush Securities analysts have previously estimated that fully onshoring iPhone assembly could raise the retail price of a flagship model from around $1,200 to potentially $3,000–$3,500. For many middle-class consumers, a $3,500 smartphone would be simply unaffordable.

Beyond labor, facility construction is also far more expensive in the United States. Building a modern, ISO-certified cleanroom and precision assembly line requires custom HVAC systems to maintain strict temperature and humidity controls. Utilities in U.S. states such as California or New York carry higher tariff rates, and regulatory hurdles—ranging from environmental impact assessments to local zoning approvals—can delay groundbreaking by months or even years. In contrast, Chinese provinces offer turnkey factory shells with preapproved permits and on-site logistics support. Repurposing existing U.S. plants is rarely an option, since most known facilities lack the floor-plan flexibility or infrastructure needed for Apple’s high-density assembly lines.

Component Sourcing and the Semiconductor Bottleneck

A less visible but no less critical hurdle is Apple’s reliance on advanced semiconductors—particularly chips for processors, power management and 5G modems. Until very recently, the vast majority of these chips were designed in the United States but manufactured in advanced foundries in Taiwan, South Korea or parts of Malaysia. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 sought to incentivize domestic chip fabrication by offering federal subsidies, but even with those incentives, building a state-of-the-art 5-nanometer wafer fab in America costs upwards of $20 billion and takes four to five years just to become operational.

While U.S.-based facilities such as TSMC’s Arizona plant and Intel’s Ohio expansion are now under construction, they focus on high-end logic chips or next-generation processors rather than the more niche packaging and testing processes Apple requires. Furthermore, wafer fabs operate under a tight global allocation of semiconductor supply; diverting capacity to produce certain Apple-focused chips in the U.S. would require renegotiating supply agreements and potentially bidding away capacity from other customers—an expensive and delicate proposition. In the meantime, Apple would still need to import semiconductors from Asia to fill any gaps, which could knock the entire “U.S.-made” marketing promise off balance. Reliable local supply of the highest-performance chips therefore remains a significant obstacle to domestic assembly.

Compounding the economic and technical challenges are questions about the legal authority to impose Apple-specific tariffs. The Trump administration has signaled that it could invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to justify a 25% levy on any imported iPhones not built in the United States. However, trade lawyers argue that applying IEEPA in this manner—targeting a single company rather than a broader category of goods—could face court challenges. Under IEEPA, the president must declare a national emergency constituting an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to justify such economic measures. Whether a court will accept the argument that the trade deficit created by foreign-made iPhones qualifies as an emergency remains untested.

Even if the administration secures legal cover, imposing a tariff exclusively on Apple could inadvertently undercut the policy’s stated goal. Competing smartphone makers—such as Samsung—would enjoy a relative price advantage in the U.S. market, potentially luring buyers away from Apple and forcing the company to absorb the duty or raise prices sharply. To avoid this scenario, the administration would need to apply the tariff to all foreign-made smartphones, not just iPhones—a move that would spark its own backlash from consumers, lawmakers and business groups. The resulting uncertainty around tariff classifications and possible appeals could delay enforcement indefinitely, effectively blunting the policy’s force.

Infrastructure and Ecosystem Investment Gaps

Apple’s iPhone production demands specialized infrastructure that goes beyond any single factory. In Shenzhen and Dongguan, for example, factories operate alongside a dense concentration of electronics component makers, molders, plating shops and cable assemblers. Suppliers for miniaturized cameras, microphones, haptic motors and tiny passive parts all cluster within a few miles of Apple’s main assembly lines, enabling rapid iteration, quality control and cost savings. By comparison, U.S. industrial parks are more spread out, and environmentally stringent regulations often limit where chemical processing or precision machining can occur. Creating a similarly integrated “iPhone Valley” in America would require not only massive capital spending but also regulatory reforms to streamline permitting, incentives to attract niche suppliers, and workforce retraining programs at scale.

Several state and local governments have already tried to entice Apple and its partners by offering tax abatements, land grants and utility discounts. Yet these incentives alone cannot overcome the fact that few component vendors currently operate stateside. For instance, the Chinese network that supplies Apple with its advanced OLED displays comprises dozens of screen manufacturers, backlight installers and polarizer coaters clustered around Shanghai. In contrast, the United States has no large-scale OLED production facilities capable of meeting Apple’s volume and quality standards. Even if Apple secured incentives to build a glass substrate plant in Arizona, it would take years before advanced glass coatings, thin-film transistors and encapsulation processes could be perfected to Apple’s rigorous specifications.

Attempts at Partial Onshoring and Gradual Localization

Faced with insurmountable immediate challenges, Apple appears to be exploring a more incremental approach. By accelerating the shift of some lower-tier assembly and component packaging to India and Vietnam, the company can hedge against geopolitical and tariff risks without fully overhauling its core supply chain. For example, the “Made in India” label on certain iPhone models beginning in early 2026 reflects this strategy: while final assembly occurs in Tamil Nadu’s factories, critical components— such as the A-series chip, Face ID module and OLED screen—still originate in China or South Korea. Under this model, Apple sidesteps a direct fight over a U.S. “build or pay tariff” ultimatum, while preserving the ability to expand assembly capacity if robotics technology matures sufficiently.

Industry insiders also note that Apple is boosting investment in U.S. research facilities focused on advanced packaging and testing. In states such as Arizona and California, Apple has created small-scale laboratories that experiment with next-generation soldering, wafer-level bonding and microelectromechanical system (MEMS) production. Those efforts aim to cultivate a domestic ecosystem for certain high-value-touch processes—particularly those related to proprietary sensor calibration and camera alignment. However, scaling these pilot lines to full-volume production remains a distant prospect, especially without a parallel build-out of local “Tier 2” and “Tier 3” suppliers.

Despite the political impetus and occasional high-profile proclamations, the obstacles to producing iPhones entirely in the United States are formidable. Overhauling a supply chain that has been honed for decades to leverage global efficiencies cannot occur overnight. From the dense web of component suppliers in Asia, the technological limits of robotics, skill shortages in American manufacturing, to the legal intricacies of imposing a company-specific tariff, each barrier is significant on its own—and together they create a formidable wall. For Apple, the most plausible path forward lies in incremental onshoring of specific components and selective automation, rather than a wholesale repatriation of assembly lines. Even then, consumers should be prepared for higher price tags and limited availability as the company navigates a complex web of economic, technical and regulatory challenges. Trusting that tiny screws and tariff threats alone will bring about a U.S.-made iPhone overlooks the reality that modern smartphone production demands a deeply integrated industrial ecosystem—one that the United States is only beginning to rebuild.

(Adapted from Investing.com)