Standing near the very top of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s power structure, Ebrahim Raisi was considered a sure thing to become its leader. He was dealt a new hand by a sudden turn.

His sudden death in a helicopter accident on Sunday has put a stop to the escalating conjecture about the future successor of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the 85-year-old Supreme Leader, whose personal well-being has long been the subject of great curiosity.

It is hardly anticipated that the unfortunate demise of Iran’s hardline ruler would significantly alter Iranian policies or shake the Islamic Republic.

However, it will put to the test a system in which elected and unelected conservative hardliners currently control every arm of government.

“The system will make a massive show of his death and stick to constitutional procedures to show functionality, while it seeks a new recruit who can maintain conservative unity and loyalty to Khamenei,” observes Dr Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the Chatham House think tank.

The departure of a former prosecutor who was accused of playing a key role in the mass execution of political prisoners in the 1980s—a charge the prosecutor denied—will be welcomed by Raisi’s opponents, who believe that his removal from office would expedite the end of this dictatorship.

The official burial will be a deeply emotional event for Iran’s governing conservatives, who will also use it as a chance to begin expressing their signals of continuity.

They’re aware that everyone is looking.

“In Western narratives, Iran was supposed to collapse and fall apart for about forty years,” Tehran University Professor Mohammed Marandi told the BBC.

“But somehow, miraculously, it’s still here and I predict it will still be here in years to come.”

When that considerably more significant transfer occurs, this middle-ranking cleric’s seat on the Assembly of Experts, which has the authority to select the next supreme leader, is another crucial role that has to be filled.

Dr. Vakil describes the mysterious selection process, in which a number of candidates, including the son of the Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, are thought to be in the running, as follows: “Raisi was a potential successor because, like Khamenei himself when he became supreme leader, he was relatively young, very loyal, an ideologue committed to the system who has name recognition.”

The Ayatollah stated in a post on X that “the Iranian people should not worry, there will be no disruption in the country’s affairs” even before Raisi’s passing was formally verified.

Organising early presidential elections will be the most pressing political problem.

Vice-President Muhammad Mokhber has taken over; fresh elections have to be held in 50 days.

This appeal to voters will occur barely months after the country, which formerly took pride in its robust and passionate involvement in this exercise, revealed record low attendance in the legislative elections held in March.

Recent elections, including as the one in 2021 that saw Raisi win the presidency, were particularly notable for the monitoring body’s methodical removal of competitors who supported change and were moderate.

“Early presidential elections could provide Khamenei and the upper echelons of the state with an opportunity to reverse that trajectory to give voters a way back into the political process,” says Mohammad Ali Shabani, editor of London-based news website Amwaj.media.

“But, unfortunately, so far we have seen no indications of the state being ready and willing to take such a step.”

However, it doesn’t seem like there is a clear successor even among Raisi’s own team.

Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the Berlin-based think tank SWP, notes that there are “different camps within this conservative group, including individuals who are more hardline and others regarded as more pragmatic.”

He thinks this will make the present power struggles in the new parliament and local government more intense.

The person who takes over Raisi’s role inherits a restrictive agenda and few control levers.

The Supreme Leader is the final decision-maker in the Islamic Republic.

The expanding dominance of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) controls foreign policy, particularly in the area.

When Iran faced extraordinary tensions with its arch-enemy Israel over the disastrous Israel-Gaza conflict months ago, the president did not make the decisions.

It touched off a perilous tit-for-tat and raised concerns about the possibility of an even scarier escalatory spiral in several capitals, most notably Tehran.

But even as he oversaw daily operations, Iranians were grappling with mounting financial difficulties brought on by harsh international sanctions, poor management, and corruption.

More than 40% of the value of the rial was lost due to inflation.

Under his leadership, the Islamic Republic was also rocked by a remarkable uprising that began in September 2022 when Mahsa Amini, 22, died in police detention after being arrested by morality police for allegedly breaking Iran’s severe clothing code.

Raisi had tightened Iran’s “hijab and chastity law,” which required women to act and dress modestly, including donning a headscarf, a few weeks prior to the upheaval.

However, a younger generation of women led the demonstrations, which were primarily directed towards the Supreme Leader and the system itself as the true sources of power, in response to a number of limitations placed on their lives.

Human rights organisations claim that thousands were arrested and hundreds of were died during the operation.

“Rausi did not have the popular mandate of his predecessor Rouhani, who was elected with the lowest recorded turnout in Iranian presidential elections history,” Shabani says, referring to Hassan Rouhani, a reformist leader whose initial popularity was bolstered in part by the historic nuclear deal struck in 2015, which collapsed when President Trump withdrew the US unilaterally three years later.

There was little movement in the indirect negotiations between Raisi’s staff and President Biden’s administration.

“He avoided much of the ire which was directed at Rouhani by opponents of the Islamic Republic, partly because he was simply seen as less influential and effectual,” explains Shabani.

Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s foreign minister, lost his life in the helicopter accident as well. He actively worked to advocate Tehran’s position to the international community and find solutions to lessen the harsh effects of sanctions.

He was the face and voice of Iran’s friends in frantic phone calls and meetings with Western and Arab foreign ministers eager to defuse and limit tensions during the Israel-Gaza conflict.

“He was a useful channel to pass messages,” commented a senior Western diplomatic source. “But it tended to be quite formulaic since power did not lie in the foreign ministry.”

According to analyst Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, CEO of the Bourse and Bazaar think tank, “the sudden death of a president is normally a consequential event but, despite being seen as a potential Supreme Leader, he lacked political support and any clear political vision.” “But without him, the political operatives who helped him win will adapt and progress.”

(Adapted from BBC.com)